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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to problematize Amitav Acharya’s Global International            
Relations framework, demonstrate problems with IR’s reliance on the English language, as            
well as IR’s political economy, and show how these three factors may impede the              
development and incorporation of Global IR in modern IR overall. 
The first argument that this thesis presents is a problematization of the emphasis on              
English within IR, and it will do so over the first two chapters. The first chapter of the thesis                   
tackles with the use of English in the contemporary international climate, where, as Bunce et               
al. and Kubota & Okuda demonstrate how English shapes and intervenes in international             
politics and developments. The second chapter, which will look at the state of the English               
language in IR theory, demonstrates that English is tied closely together with the legitimacy              
of IR as an academic discipline as well as in the imagining of globalisation, and how it has                  
shaped the creation of the Us vs. Them dichotomy that encounters so much criticism within               
IR. 
The second argument, which will be approached in Chapter 3, will turn to the political               
economy of IR, and how this has helped in the creation of the homogenous academic field we                 
work in today. By looking at the development of the university as an institution for research                
through Kamola’s argument, the presence of the publish or perish culture, and the problems              
that this, combined with the English-dominated Western IR, present for the globalising of IR              
- one of the mission statements of Global IR. 
This thesis will conclude by suggesting a potential alternative approach that Global IR             
can look into to tackle the issues that are presented throughout the thesis. 
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Introduction 
When beginning my Master’s degree in IR at Leiden University, the introductory            1
days focused on painting a picture familiar to me from my days as a BA International Studies                 
student. IR, according to Professor Andre Gerrits, was a field that was struggling, caught              
flat-footed in the whirlwind of change and globalisation that has come about following the              
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The supremacy of the United States of America,               
which was supposed to have it’s “unipolar moment”, has increasingly been challenged, and             
as more and more global problems (such as global warming) have increasingly been coming              
to the fore, nation-states (the problematic ‘building block’ of the current global world order)              
have increasingly been looking inwards. IR, as a field of study, needed to not only play catch                 
up, but push itself to the fore, find itself a renewed sense of (policy) purpose, and through that                  
remain relevant as an academic field, one that was international in nature and not a constant                
source of fuel for the ‘merits’ of global capitalism and the nation state. By taking a more                 
humanities-based approach, Gerrits concluded, we would be able to provide room for the             
approaches of the ‘Rest’ to take their place alongside those of the ‘West’, not only in IR but                  
in policy decisions and similarly political matters . 2
The more that we studied the matter, however, the clearer it became that this day               
would be far off indeed. For while our attention was drawn to diverse alternative approaches               
that would be able to form a new core to IR’s new (and truly ‘global’) structuring, there was                  
almost always something missing: ideas in practice. Ideas such as Amitav Acharya’s Global             
1 This thesis distinguishes between ​IR and ​international relations​. IR is the academic study of international                
relations, which is the interactions between states, non-state actors, and other players on an international arena.  
2 Andre Gerrits, lecture during the introduction days for the February intake of the MA International Relations,                 
Leiden University, February 2018. 
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International Relations, while increasingly applied to the field of (non-Western) IR theory ,            3
fail to translate its contributions to practice. Furthermore, the very problems that we were told               
we would be solving only seem to be getting worse. Already the notion of “us vs. them”, as                  
of the time of writing, is leading to Brexit, the departure of one of the key architects of many                   
of the European Union (henceforth the EU)’s central agreements , Great Britain, from the             4
EU. 
It was interesting, therefore, to find out that English will continue to play a role in                
many EU practices, despite the (probable) departure of it’s single largest native            
English-speaking community. While it’s continued presence in the EU makes sense (since            5
there are still member-states outside of the UK who use English as their official language),               
it’s representation throughout international relations, particularly as working language in          
many regional organisations, is slightly confusing. The use of English is almost ubiquitous             
with this information age, with the internet and other digital means making global boundaries              
less and less important. Finding a common language to communicate in is, theoretically, only              
a boon. 
As many scholars of linguistics have shown, however, this is far from the case. An               
oft-commented on reality is that, as Antonio de Nebrija pointed out to Queen Isabella of               
Spain, “language has always been the perfect tool of empire.” Yet (as Liu asserts in 2004)                
“the relationship between international politics and the study of sign, however, is not patently              
3 Amitav Acharya, “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions,” ​International Studies            
Review​, 18 (2016) 
4 The bellicose stance Theresa May’s government has historically taken against the EU and it’s various                
institutions has been mocked by public figures and newspapers from both within the UK and outside. See the                  
following Patrick Stewart sketch for an example. 
“Patrick Stewart Sketch: What has the ECHR ever done for us?” The Guardian, accessed 22 December, 2018,                 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ptfmAY6M6aA 
5 “EU has no plans to downgrade use of English after Brexit,” The Guardian, accessed 22 December, 2018.                  
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/04/eu-has-no-plans-to-downgrade-use-of-english-after-brexit 
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obvious, nor are the disciplines of international law and linguistic science in the habit of               
speaking to each other in today’s scholarship. ” The curiosity here lies in that, if IR is a field                  6
of study that has to observe and challenge the outcomes of imperialisms the world over, a                
rigorous study of language in IR has only been a phenomenon of the past decade. While it is                  
being looked at as a player in the establishing and keeping of the ‘West’s’ dominant position                
over the ‘Rest’, rarely until now has its role within IR itself been observed. The               
disentrenching of the role of language, noted as one of the challenges that modern IR (within                
the framework of Acharya’s Global IR ) will have to face, carries further than merely being               7
conscious of language as a source of what Peter Vale describes as “a powerful instrument of                
social control especially in fields like IR [...]” . 8
The work done for Amitav Acharya’s “Global International Relations” project is           
important for IR, as it is a long and hard look at many of the problems that IR has faced in the                      
past, many of the problems that IR is facing in the 21st century, and offers a framework for                  
how we are going to try to tackle these problems. However, as this thesis will demonstrate,                
mere awareness of the role of language as a gatekeeping practice in IR will not help further                 
the Global IR ‘revolution’ (the IRevolution, if you will) - not for a lack of trying, but                 9
because the English language cannot be separated from the ideas and practices that it has               
embodied. English as a tool for communication embodies too many core assumptions of a              
Westphalian and European Renaissance nature, which may clash with the outlooks of            
different cultures and their fundamental understanding of how the world functions.           
6 Lydia Liu, ​The Clash of Empires - the Invention of China in Modern World Making​.  
7 See Acharya, “Advancing Global IR” 
8 Peter Vale, “Inclusion and Exclusion,” ​International Studies Review​, Vol. 18, no. 1 (2016): 161. 
9 Using the word ‘revolution’ in tandem with Global IR is ironic at first glance - Global IR aims to subsume,                     
rather than supplant, existing IR theories and methods. However, as IR’s history has long been a one-way                 
‘West’ looking at, and writing about, the ‘Rest’, the proposed objectives of Global IR sufficiently qualify, in my                  
opinion, as a revolution within the IR of the information age - the IRevolution. Not all revolutions are violent,                   
nor do they all inherently reject what they are revolting against. 
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Furthermore, IR’s “publish-or-perish” culture means that young, ambitious scholars who          
wish to contribute to the development of Global IR have to abide by the power of the                 
pre-eminent Western journals and the existing academic culture merely to be able to survive              
and maintain a career. Western IR institutions remain too powerful and important in             
career-building, and non-Western IR institutions remain too weak in wider IR for those             
young scholars to be able to dedicate their time to, as Tang suggests, “publish high-quality               
work not only in mainstream journals, but also in regional flagship and domestic journals” .              10
Many of the scholars working on the Global IR project are tenured professors, and the               
younger scholars who need to change (and work in this changing) IR find themselves in a                
position where they are still at the whims of the field’s political economy for survival and                
career-building - meaning that writing in English for the big academic journals is still the best                
way to build a career. If Global IR wishes to address the issues that it does, it will have to                    
have a good look at how it can prevent them from repeating themselves.  
10 Shiping Tang, “Practical Concerns and Power Considerations,” ​International Studies Review​, Vol. 18, no. 1               
(2016): 163. 
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Ch. 0.5 - Global IR(evolution) 
Acharya’s Global IR, and it’s importance in modern IR 
Due to its importance to this thesis, we first need to detail what exactly Acharya’s               
Global International Relations project entails. The Global IR project is the umbrella term for              
all work done “as part of a broader challenge of reimagining IR as a global discipline [which]                 
transcends the distinction between West and non-West - or any similar binary and mutually              
exclusive categories.” Global IR is built upon the assumption that “the main theories of IR               11
are too deeply rooted in, and beholden to, the history, intellectual traditions, and agency              
claims of the West, [...] accord[ing] little more than a marginal place to those of the                
non-Western world.”  12
Global IR developed from the observation that IR, as it had existed up until that point,                
presumably failed to account for its own colonial roots, particularly during the Cold War.              13
IR, according to Acharya, had systematically ignored the problems of those countries that had              
come to be referred to as the Third World, despite the extent of conflict that happened in the                  
supposed ‘long peace’ of the Cold War . Especially in the developing of the ‘Democratic              14
Peace Theory’, the Western meddling in the ‘Third World’ would challenge claims made             
about the pacifist nature of Western liberal democracy . As Acharya asserts, Global IR is              15
necessary because: 
“...despite its growing popularity, IR’s dominant narratives, theories, and methods fail to            
correspond to the increasingly global distribution of its subjects. Distinctions between the “West”             
and the “Rest” blur in material terms, but not in the way that we study, publish, and discuss IR.                   
11 Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International               
Studies,” ​International Studies Quarterly​, Vol. 58 (2014): 649. 
12 Ibid. 
13 While it would be interesting to write a paper on the state of postcolonialism in contemporary IR scholarship,                   
that is not what this paper is about.  
14 Amitav Acharya, “Global IR and Regional Worlds,” (2014): 648. 
15 Ibid. 
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Centers of learning remain clustered in the developed West. Overcoming this disjuncture presents a              
central challenge for our discipline. ” 16
Global IR revolves around six primary dimensions, and while not all of these             
dimensions are of importance to this thesis all are mentioned to provide a more general idea                
on what Global IR entails. For a full explanation of each of these points, see Acharya, 2014. 
1. It is founded upon a pluralistic universalism: not “applying to all,” but recognising and              
respecting the diversity in us. 
2. It is grounded in ​world​ history, not just Greco-Roman, European, or US history. 
3. It subsumes, rather than supplants, existing IR theories and methods. 
4. It integrates the study of regions, regionalisms, and area studies. 
5. It eschews exceptionalism. 
6. It recognises multiple forms of agency beyond material power, including resistance,           
normative action, and local constructions of global order.  17
This thesis will engage with point three and point five of the six points of Global IR,                 
beginning with an elaboration on these points, as well as a number of questions about them.                
The first point we are discussing, Global IR’s subsuming, rather than supplanting of existing              
IR theories and methods, is based on the observation that IR theories are not monolithic or                
static when dealing with the non-North Atlantic world. Examples such as post-colonialism            
and feminism have been at the forefront of recognising the agency of those in the non-West,                
and aiming to draw theoretical insights from them for the enrichment of IR. However, as this                
thesis will problematise, if Global IR subsumes, rather than supplants, the existing IR method              
of predominantly writing in English, how are non-English terms (such as ​tianxia​, ​ba​, and              
wang ​), and non-English scholars going to be able to appropriately convey the importance of              
their arguments? The second point we are orienting this thesis around, the eschewing of              
exceptionalism, challenges the tendency to present the characteristics that are being discussed            
as homogenous, unique, or superior to others, justifying the dominance of the powerful states              
16 Acharya, “Global IR and Regional Worlds,” (2014): 649. 
17 Ibid. 
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over the weak. While Global IR may aim to eschew exceptionalism, the question is, will the                
academic world? Will the major IR publications and institutions be willing to give up their               
‘exceptional’ position in the production of IR knowledge, or in the modern publish-or-perish             
culture in academia as a whole? 
While this thesis will offer a critique based on both a linguistic and a political               
economy perspective, it is important to not understate the importance of Global IR in modern               
IR academia. Merely understanding the world as it has been done in IR in the past no longer                  
correlates with the reality we face today, and Global IR is one of the most thought-out and                 
engaged frameworks that IR academia has available to it. However, as this thesis will argue               
later, Global IR brings with it it’s own problems; namely, a problematic relationship with              
language, and the political economy of IR, both of which favour scholars that are already               
established within IR. The framework risks being undermined by failing to address these             
problems, as (if Global IR aims to be a serious road for the future) the future generations that                  
are to work into IR need to be able to work in the diversity that Global IR espouses ​now if                    
Global IR aims to make serious progress in the field. 
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Ch. 1 - The Dragons of the Past 
English as the mythological ​hydra​, and its relationship to IR 
Why dedicate a chapter to the problems that exist with English on the global scale               
when we are discussing Global IR? IR academics already see the important role that language               
plays on the framing of ideas - a conscience of the matter that has come about due to the                   
Linguistic Turn in IR. The problematic point in this regard is that, while academics are               18
increasingly aware of how important language is in the globalised world order, they continue              
to write in English and the world continues to revolve around English as the global ​lingua                
franca ​. There is more to the use of English that has to be taken into consideration with the                  
development of Global IR, not only inside academia (which will be discussed in Ch. 2), but                
also outside of the context of academia, and while many sources and articles point out the                
fact that language has a role in the creation of the global world, many who are not discussing                  
language spare little more than an acknowledgement of the importance of language in their              
overall argument, or leave it out altogether . Merely acknowledging that language plays a             19
role in the formation of the globalised world risks undervaluing just how ​big a role it plays in                  
the power dynamics in both international relations and IR, and thereby undervaluing the             
influences that language has on IR. This chapter will demonstrate how influential English is              
in our current world order - outside of the realm of IR academia. Within the realm of IR, the                   
linguistic turn, as well as the onset of post-positivism and constructivism as important             
18 We will be taking a closer look at the Linguistic Turn in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
19 See Peter Vale, “If International Relations lives on the street, what is it doing in the classroom?” ​International                   
Relations​, Vol. 28, no. 2 (2014): 153 - 155 as an example of the former, and Amitav Acharya, “Global                   
International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds - A New Agenda for International Studies,” ​International              
Studies Quarterly​, Vol. 58 (2014) as an example where it is left out altogether despite its importance in (neo-)                   
colonial relationships 
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theoretical considerations, have raised awareness of the role that language plays, and these             
will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
If we are to look into the impacts of English on international relations outside of an                
academic context, it is first important to acknowledge how widespread the use of English is               
in international relations. English is the predominant language of many major regions that             
Global IR proposes we integrate more into IR . Regional actors, such as the Association of               20
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), use English as their main working language , and it is              21
one of the primary languages that is used in the EU . As commented on before, the role of                  22
English within the EU will not be reduced despite it’s single largest native-speaking             
population departing the Union, which could be seen as a sign of its central nature within the                 
linguistically-diverse institution. 
Couldn’t the widespread nature of English function as an overall boon to IR, though?              
As D’aoust points out, the fact that there is a lingua franca for IR has resulted in the emerging                   
of certain communities that might otherwise have remained closed off, such as the Spanish IR               
community. Supposedly, it is better to adapt to the English-dominated nature of IR than to               23
remain focused on one’s own linguistic community, “since an effort in the opposite direction              
- coming from the English-speaking IR community - is not likely to happen.”  24
However, as D’aoust suggests, one has to write in English to be perceived and              
acknowledged as “doing IR” , a stance which ignores the complexities of the relationship             25
20 See point 4 of the six dimensions of Global IR 
21 “List of official languages by institution,” Wikipedia, accessed 22 December, 2018. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_official_languages_by_institution​; Bunce et al. ​Why English? Confronting       
the Hydra ​(New York: Multilingual Matters, 2016): 6 
22Ibid. 
23 Anne-marie D’aoust, “Accounting for the politics of language in the sociology of IR,” ​Journal of                
International Relations and Development​, Vol. 15 (2012): 122. 
24 Garcia Segura, “Spain.” In ​International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives, and Destinations​, eds.              
Knud Erik Jorgensen & Tonny Brems Knudsen (Milton Park and New York: Routledge, 2006), 111, 120. Cited                 
in D’aoust, “Language in the sociology of IR”: 122. 
25 D’aoust, “Language in the sociology of IR”: 121. 
11 
T​HOMAS VAN ​E​LS 
L​ANGUAGE, ​P​OLITICAL ​E​CONOMY, AND ​G ​LOBAL ​IR​(EVOLUTION) 
 
between language and knowledge production that should be accounted for in sociological            
studies. While this stance is oriented mostly at IR as a discipline, it does contain bearings on                 26
the position of English in this modern, globalising world. An observation of the role of               
English on international relations and development demonstrates the shortcomings and          
pitfalls that Global IR has to acknowledge and be wary of. We will turn to the work of Bunce                   
et al. and their conceptualisation of English as a global ​hydra​, as well as that of Watts and his                   
myths about English​, to elaborate. 
As Bunce et al. demonstrate in ​Why English? Confronting the Hydra​, there exists an              
“​uncritical acceptance of English [and an] equally uncritical hostility to, and a devaluing of,              
other languages” within many contemporary cultures in the modern ‘global’ era. This            27
continues to “impact in negative ways on other languages and cultures. While English opens              
the doors of privilege and access to ​some​, often the ​few​, the way many countries organise                
education systems means that the English door is closed for the ​many​.” The reputation that               28
English now holds is as much a legacy of colonial times, with the British empire (and the                 
USA) exporting their native language as a tool to consolidate it’s budding (commercial)             
empires, as it is a decision on the domestic policy-maker’s part to try to keep in touch with                  
the global economy, the internet, global youth culture, and the increasingly global nature of              
the media . According to Bunce et al., the problems lie in the linguicism that the British                29
empire promoted: “the privileging of the English language over other, native, languages in             
the domains of state administration and education, structurally favouring English, and           
believing that this is justified and necessary, in a similar way to racism, sexism, and class                
26 Ibid. 
27 Bunce et al. “Introduction,” in ​Why English? Confronting the Hydra​, ed. Bunce et al. (Bristol, New York,                  
Ontario: Multilingual Matters, 2016): 3. 
28 Bunce et al. “Introduction,” in ​Why English? Confronting the Hydra​: 1. 
29 Ibid. 
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divisions” . This privileging of the role of language, Bunce et al. assert, is more neocolonial               30
than postcolonial, as many former colonies are “still connected with the former colonial             
powers through a wide range of economic, political, military and cultural links, as well as               
language. [They are] integrated into the capitalist world order [...] in a subordinate,             
neocolonial​ position.”  31
Why is it then, that the privileging of English is believed to be both justified and                
necessary? Even in the face of an increased regional awareness throughout the world today,              
the ‘perceived’ necessity of English only seems to be growing. According to Watts, English              
has been able to reach its position of prominence due to a series of ​myths that have been                  
propagated through language policy, advertising, and stereotyping, among other reasons.          
While myths, according to Watts, are not outright lies, people tend to take them less seriously                
than statements of factual truths - indeed, the etymology of myth comes from the ancient               
Greek word for ‘story’ . Despite being taken less seriously, however, myths form an integral              32
part of the formation of culture, imparting upon those that learn these stories while acquiring               
the languages a “narrative cultural embedding of beliefs, and they help us to construct a               
foundation for performing acts of identity in emergent social practice ” Myths fulfil a “vital              33
function in explaining, justifying and ratifying present behaviour by the narrated events of the              
past” . 34
Watts elaborates further on the various types of myths that exist within both historical              
and contemporary English, spread through the teaching of the language: the linguistic            
homogeneity myth and it’s derivative legitimate language myth; the polite language myth, the             
30 Bunce et al. “Introduction,” in ​Why English? Confronting the Hydra​: 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Watts. “1. Defining Myths,” in ​Language Myths and the History of English (New York: Oxford University                 
Press, 2011), accessed 30 Sept. 2018. 
33 Watts, “Defining Myth” in ​Language Myths and the History of English​, ch. 1. 
34 Richard Watts, “Mythical strands in the ideology of prescriptivism” (2000), cited in Watts, 2011. 
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superiority of English myth and the superior language myth, the immutability myth, the             
perfect language myth, the pure language myth, the economic benefit myth, the academic             
language myth, and the global language myth. While many of these myths have applications              
when discussing linguistic policies and Bunce et al.’s Hydra, a select few of them are               
important when it comes to academic English. 
Myths about the English language, at least according to Watts’ definition, are            
pervasive throughout the world. According to him, English, as a global language, is             
characterised by English being an (a) easy-to-learn language, (b) a practical language, and             
that (c) the desire to learn English is instrumentally motivated. As Watts argues, though, the               35
focus on teaching, and the emphasis on using ‘correct’ (as in, grammatically correct) English              
has long been used as a tool to enforce a certain power dynamic within the Anglophone                
community. This is reinforced in turn by English as an Additional Language (EAL/ ESL)              36
teaching. Rather than developing communicative skills, EAL teaching focuses more on the            
achieving of a degree of grammatical proficiency, as this is ‘proper English’ . EAL teaching              37
and the assumptions that come along with it present a number of challenges, mostly              
associated with the realities that disprove a number of myths. 
A practical demonstration of how English and its myths influence policy decisions, is             
the use of English in Japan, by studying Kubota and Okuda’s chapter in Bunce et al. While                 
Wattsian myths about English have permeated into Japanese society , it is interesting to             38
preface this with the translation of English (the language) in Japanese. The characters used              
35 Watts, “Commodifying English,” in ​Language Myths and the History of English​: 264. 
36 Watts, “Establishing a Linguistic Pedigree,” in ​Language Myths and the History of English​: 28 - 53. 
37 This is an example of the ‘perfect language’ myth - the belief that the goal of learning English is to be able to                        
speak the language perfectly. 
38 Ryuko Kubota & Tomoyo Okuda, “Confronting Language Myths, Linguicism and Racism in English              
Language Teaching in Japan” in ​Why English? Confronting the Hydra​, eds. Bunce et al. (Bristol: Multilingual                
Matters, 2016): 77 - 87. 
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for English in Japanese, ​eigo (英語) place English inherently in a privileged position; the first               
character, ​ei (英) translates to ​excellent​, as well as English, according to the Genki series of                
Japanese language textbooks . The use of non-alphabetic signs to create/enforce power           39
relations will be encountered again in Chapter 2, but we make an initial mention of ​eigo (英                
語), as it does provide something to take into consideration when considering the arguments              
of Kubota and Okuda. 
According to Kubota & Okuda, the selection of Tokyo as host for the 2020 Olympic               
Games has revealed two major myths about English in Japanese society: the ​global language              
myth and the ​economic benefit myth ​. The former suggests that “learning English will ‘enable              
the learner to communicate with anybody in the world’”, and the latter assumes “that learning               
English will ‘guarantee better and financially more lucrative job opportunities’ or bring            
individual and national economic success in the new global economy.”  40
The former, which posits that English is a universally useful language (‘enabl[ing] the             
learner to communicate with anybody in the world’ ) that “can readily connect speakers from              41
diverse linguistic backgrounds” is easily dismissed as inaccurate by Kubota and Okuda with             42
the assertion that not everyone, even in the ‘global’ world, speaks English . Their argument              43
on this point is elaborated on by stating that easy access to the acquisition of English is not                  
something that is universally present, and those who do have ready access to English              
acquisition have an economic edge - as those with an economic advantage will typically have               
an easier time in acquiring English if they are not born within the Anglophone world .               44
39 “英”, ​Genki: An Integrated Course in Elementary Japanese​ (Toyko: The Japan Times, 2011):​ ​283 
40 Watts, ​Language Myths​: 285 - 286, cited in Kubota & Okuda, “Confronting Language Myths”: 77. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Kubota & Okuda, “Confronting Language Myths” in ​Why English?​: 78. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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Finally, English (or any other language) cannot possibly “fulfill all the demands of global and               
local communication”, although it is “useful for many purposes” . 45
The latter myth, the economic benefit myth, ties in closely to the global neoliberal              
capitalist order , and neoliberal economics in general. The assumption is that the use and              46
promotion of English will reduce structural barriers, increasing competition, mobility,          
flexibility, and the productivity of workers. The onus shifts from the company to provide job               
security and social safety nets to workers, who are expected to build up the human capital and                 
communication skills to be able to increase personal employability . The assumption with            47
the economic benefit myth is that work and all business life is done in English, and while                 
Japanese international businesses require some proficiency with English, the “percentage of           
people in Japan who actually require English competence is small” , and even with English              48
as a competency, companies may not even necessarily consider English (or other language             
competencies in general) a necessity when making hiring decisions . The notion that English             49
is always connected to economic benefit, as the ​economic benefit ​myth implies, falls short              
according to Kubota when one observes that there is no statistical correlation between             
English proficiency and income . 50
Despite the flaws that English language teaching (and the overall state of the myths              
about English) possess, they remain quite ingrained in Japan, where both the general             
populace as well as members at a governmental level continue to ascribe to them . With the                51
hosting of the 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo, the Japanese government has doubled down              
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Kubota & Okuda, “Confronting Language Myths” in ​Why English?​: 79. 
48 Kubota, 2011, cited in Kubota & Okuda, “Confronting Language Myths” in  ​Why English?​: 79. 
49 Kubota & Okuda, “Confronting Language Myths” in ​Why English?​: 79. 
50 Ibid.; F. Grin, “Language planning and economics,” ​Current Issues in Language Planning​, Vol. 4 (2003). 
51 Ibid. 
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on its efforts to promote English as a Second Language in preparation for the foreign               
delegations that will descend on Tokyo when the games come . The ​global language myth              52
justifies both the training of additional English interpreters (despite not all visitors to the              
Olympics speaking English), and the sending of secondary education teachers to           
English-speaking countries to improve their English skills . Kubota & Okuda further assert            53
that the cultural obsession with test scores places an overemphasis on Tests of English as a                
Foreign Language (TOEFL) tests, with the emphasis on learning ‘perfect’ English directing            
the attention away from socio-economic, racial, gender, and “various other inequalities that            
affect people’s social mobility”  in lieu of test scores and studying abroad . 54 55
Throughout this chapter, we have observed the position of English in the current             
global order, as well as its use as a tool in enforcing and reinforcing power dynamics and                 
neocolonial relationships. As Bunce et al. suggest, the prestige that the English language has              
reached is beginning to form a threat to international linguistic diversity; the culture that the               
language is intrinsically tied together with threatens international cultural diversity . This           56
might bode ill to IR as a whole, for while it is struggling to expand its roots and become a                    
truly global practice, the world that it is trying to come to terms with might cease to exist                  
altogether. While English is already closely associated with the age of globalisation, the risk              
that it will become a part of it is all too real.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Kubota & Okuda, “Confronting Myths”: 80; Another myth comes to the fore here: that maximum exposure to                  
a target language helps make one more proficient in it 
54 Kubota & Okuda, “Confronting Language Myths” in ​Why English?​: 84. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Bunce et al. ​Why English? Confronting the Hydra​. 
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Ch. 2 - Lost in Translation 
Imagined Meaning Through Embedded Assumption 
While English continues to create itself a larger and larger role in the contemporary              
world, academia, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, has already had a long look at the                
role of language as a tool for shaping the world and how the people inside it act amongst one                   
another. Works like Bunce et al. and Watts’ demonstrate that IR and academia as a whole is                 
aware and engaging with language. The field of IR, however, has to contend with more than                
how English influences globalisation - and as a framework that aims to incorporate the ‘Rest’               
more into IR, Global IR needs to look beyond how English has influenced international              
relations and IR theorising, but also how it continues to do so. With English established as the                 
academic ​lingua franca​, it is assumed that all members of the academic community are at a                
native-speaker level of proficiency. While language has been acknowledged as a form of             
suppression that Global IR will have to face for its role in the gatekeeping in IR , the                 57
problems that it presents as the ‘main’ academic language receive less attention. The             
idolisation of English as the ‘main’ academic language leads to the very real possibility that               
other, ‘less important’ languages are phased out in favour of the more prestigious English              
language, or do not even get the chance to develop themselves into languages for scientific               
communication. If Global IR is to subsume, rather than supplant, the practices and             58
methodologies of IR as it has existed up until this point, it is most likely that the field’s use                   
of, and dependence on, English will continue to maintain its central role in IR academia - as                 
D’aoust has claimed, you need to be writing in English to be seen as ‘doing IR’. This                 
57 Acharya, “Advancing Global IR,” ​International Studies Review​ (2016): 10. 
58 Bunce et al. “Introduction,” in ​Why English? Confronting the Hydra​: 12. 
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dependence on English, furthermore, entails power relations of its own. As D’aoust points             
out, the mindset of 
‘Just learn/publish/work’ in English, as many would have it, is seldom ‘just’ about             
‘learning/publishing/ working’ in English. For many non-native speakers, it often entails           
negotiating political stances and identities, intellectual credit and recognition, as well as emotional             
dimensions in their own work.  59
Global IR, however, while it does acknowledge the state of language and the             
emphasis on the English language within IR , offers little in the way of solutions that involve                60
a critical look at English; proposed solutions merely focus on the inclusion of non-Western              
authors in IR’s ongoing debates .  61
This is problematic, for more reasons than those that have been laid out in Chapter 1.                
The English language structures the world in numerous ways, as has been shown by the               
linguistic turn in philosophy and its impacts on IR. Furthermore, because of this emphasis on               
English, Western notions and concepts are imposed on non-Western terms, theories, and            
approaches, or construct them in ways that were never originally intended; the problematic             
history and current relationship between the ‘West’ and China, as it is argued by Liu and                
Nordin, is one of the results of this mismatching of Western intentions and non-Western              
notions. Finally, as Kamola demonstrates, English (through American academic institutions)          
creates the concept of globalisation, not by observing and acknowledging it, but by             
understanding diverse elements of the modern world as part of an ​imagined phenomenon             
called globalisation . The English language has defined much of both how IR has formed,              62
59 D’aoust, “Accounting for the politics of language in the sociology of IR,” (2012): 121. 
60 Acharya, “Advancing Global IR,” ​International Studies Review (2016): 10; Peter Vale, “Inclusion and              
Exclusion,” ​International Studies Review​, Vol. 18, no. 1 (2016): 161 - 162. 
61 Acharya, “Advancing Global IR,” ​International Studies Review​ (2016): 10. 
62 Isaac Kamola, “US Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary,” ​The British Journal of Politics                 
and International Relations​, Vol. 16 (2014). 
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and how international relations have occurred, both in how history has occurred, and how we               
are understanding our current world. 
Awareness of how language has shaped the creation of IR has been a facet of the field                 
ever since the 80’s when a linguistic turn entered the field through the work of Nicholas                
Onuf. Despite the lack of a full-on theoretical definition of a linguistic turn within IR , the                63
linguistic turn has been an aspect of philosophy since the early 20th Century , and the               64
linguistic turn and its sub-set, discourse analysis, has been an aspect of constructivism “for a               
generation.” For a term that is this central to this chapter’s argument, we need to provide a                 65
working definition for the conclusions of the linguistic turn . The linguistic turn can be              66
perceived as homonymical, as it is used to refer to the moment that linguistic analysis and                
constructivism became accepted within the field of IR in the 1980’s , as well as one of the                 67
aspects of constructivist schools of thought focusing on the role of language in the              
construction of international events. As a result of the homonymous nature of the term              
‘linguistic turn’, it’s uses as a term differ from scholar to scholar - hence, the necessity of a                  
working definition of what the linguistic turn means as a scholarly term. 
Philosophers like Wittgenstein, de Saussure, and Derrida have pointed out that the            
world - or our perception of it - are inherently bound together with language. It is through                 
language that we conceptualise a series of walls, a door, and a roof as a building, even if                  
these linguistic ‘signs’ are arbitrarily related to reality at best . Within IR, the linguistic turn               68
63 The analysis of language within the field of IR is, rather, seen as an aspect of either constructivism or critical                     
theory. 
64 “Linguistic turn,” ​Wikipedia​. Accessed 31 December, 2018. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn  
65 Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” ​Millenium: Journal of                 
International Studies​, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2002): 627. 
66 Whatever definition we create here is incomplete at best, as the term has seen so many different uses and                    
iterations throughout IR’s history that there are numerous differences and important factors between definitions.              
Clarifying the linguistic turn would be an interesting project for further research. 
67 This particular homonymous meaning of the ‘linguistic turn’ is also referred to as the ​third debate​. 
68 “Deconstruction”, ​Encyclopaedia Britannica​, accessed online 1 January, 2019. 
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has shown that language is an essential transmitter of knowledge, as without language we              
cannot communicate ideas to one another. This means that, as a result, there are always at                
least two parties involved in the use of any language; the speaker (who may not be able to                  
properly convey his idea), and the receiver (who may not understand the intentions of the               
speaker). The linguistic turn draws attention to the fact that these two ​agents (the speaker and                
the receiver) are fundamentally different (although similarities between the two may exist),            
and that we need to differentiate between the two, and acknowledge that, as Kessler points               
out, we should “treat ‘you’ (the receiver) not just like another ‘I’ (the speaker).” As               69
language shapes how we perceive the world around us, so too do our innate assumptions               
shape how we perceive and use language. 
The linguistic turn, as a result, is the orientation of an IR academic’s study around the                
role of language on how IR and international relations is performed specifically. Scholarship             
on this linguistic turn has demonstrated, as is shown in Chapter 1, the problems that the use                 
of English have presented to the development of our ‘globalised’ world, the flaws, and the               
foundations that this is underpinned by. If language is a series of propositions on how we see                 
the world, and the linguistic turn a framing of scholarship with a certain lens, it might be                 
worth turning this lens inwards, and acknowledging a number of the core notions that the               
linguistic turn, particularly as it pertains to English and Global IR, bring to the fore. 
A core notion of English - particularly academic English and academia - is it’s              
continued adherence to Western ‘logocentrism’. As Derrida points out, Western schools of            
thought contends that there is a realm of ‘truth’ that exists prior to, and independent from, it’s                 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/deconstruction#ref222928  
69 Oliver Kessler, “Two wrongs don’t make a right: on constructivism, practices and the linguistic turn,”                
International Studies Quarterly Online​, posted 3 April, 2017. Accessed 31 December, 2018.  
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representation by linguistic signs and scholarly analysis. This encourages us to see the             70
language that we use to describe concepts as two entirely separate phenomena, despite the              
fact that, according to Derrida, the two are inherently connected. Derrida characterises            
logocentrism as a derivative of a particular ‘metaphysics of presence’ - which is “the              
tendency to conceive fundamental philosophical concepts such as truth, reality, and being in             
terms of ideas such as presence, essence, identity, and origin - and in the process to ignore the                  
crucial role of absence and difference.”  71
For instance, if we discuss globalisation, the assumption is that there is a single,              
unified whole of a ‘globalised world’, rather than numerous connected but different worlds             
the world over - and that there is a single point of ‘modernity’ we want to work towards,                  
whereas this may be seen differently in other places in the world. Later on in this chapter, we                  
will be turning to Isaac Kamola, and his problematization of logocentrism and the             
metaphysics of presence (although he does not refer to it as such). 
The linguistic turn presents a number of problems that can impact the development of              
Global IR. The two that we will be discussing here are language itself, manifesting in the                
realm of translation, and a closer look at how the ‘metaphysics of presence’ helps in the                
creation of the global imaginary . Translation poses a problem, as not all terms can be               72
translated into English, and it may impose ideas or frameworks over what is translated that               
were never intended to be used. Words like the Dutch word ​gezellig​, which some people               
argue is a core aspect of Dutch culture , are notoriously impossible to translate. Google              73
Translate offers the main translation of ‘cozy’, it also offers ‘sociable’, ‘intimate’, ‘homey’,             
70 “Deconstruction,” ​Encyclopaedia Britannica 
71 Ibid. 
72 It would be an interesting topic for further research to detail the various impacts that the linguistic turn has on                     
Global IR. This thesis, however, focuses on just these two. 
73 “Gezellig,” DutchAmsterdam.com. Accessed 26 December, 2018. 
http://www.dutchamsterdam.nl/155-gezellig 
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‘neighbourly’, and ‘snug’ as translations , while still failing to incorporate everything that            74
the term entails. According to some, it is a prime example of the untranslatability of certain                
terms - and it functions as a reminder that notion that IR can only be done in English risks                   75
the loss of a term or the original meaning of a concept. The construction of the world,                 
particularly the imaginary of the contemporary ‘global’ world, has long been tied together to              
language and the Western ‘metaphysics of presence’. 
The case of China throughout the modern world demonstrates the confusion that            
arises from the differentiations between the speaker and the receiver, the problematic crossing             
of inter-linguistic boundaries, and the issues of losses in translation. As Liu pointed out,              
historically  
The proliferation of international treaties and agreements among sovereign states has left a             
profound mark on our thinking about language, international politics, national histories, and            
modernity in general. The relationship between international politics and the study of sign,             
however, is not patently obvious, nor are the disciplines of international law and linguistic science               
[historically] in the habit of speaking to each other in [...] scholarship.  76
The Chinese super-sign ​yi/barbarian and the misunderstandings that have come about           
due to incomplete translations in the case of the Chinese sign ​ba (霸) shows the power of                 
language in the flow of international relations. When it comes to the establishing of an               
‘other’, language and translation helps in perceiving and altering perceptions in inter-lingual            
relationships. 
One way in which language has constructed history and international affairs is            
through the creation of the super-sign. According to Liu, a super-sign is 
“not a word, but a hetero-cultural signifying chain that crisscrosses the semantic fields of two or more                 
languages simultaneously and makes an impact on the meaning of recognisable verbal units, whether              
they be indigenous words, loanwords, or any other discrete verbal phenomena that linguists can              
74 “Gezellig,” ​Google Translate​, accessed 29 November, 2018.  
75 “Gezellig,” ​Wikipedia​, accessed 25 December, 2018. 
76 Lydia Liu, ​The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge: Harvard                 
University Press, 2004): 7. 
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identify within particular languages or among them. The super-sign emerges out of the interstices of               
existing languages across the abyss of phonetic and ideographic differences. As a hetero-cultural             
signifying chain, it always requires more than one linguistic system to complete the process of               
signification for any given verbal phenomenon. The supersign can thus be figured as a manner of                
metonymical thinking that induces, compels, and orders the migration and dispersion of prior signs              
across different languages and different semiotic media. For that reason, it offers ample insight into               
the workings of intellectual catachresis…”  77
Super-signs, as complicated as Liu’s definition may be, are simply words ‘borrowed’            
from other languages, upon which a different meaning is placed than was originally intended.              
This was the case in 1832, when protests were levied against the use of the character yi when                  
referring to members of the British East India Company (henceforth BEIC), a word which              
had been translated before as simply “foreigner” but had been translated by an interpreter on               
a mission on the behalf of the BEIC as “barbarian” instead. Initially the protests against the                
use of the word started out as merely “object[ions] to this epithet and to shew from its use in                   
Chinese writings that the term conveyed reproach.” While the BEIC had numerous            78
translations before this occurring stating that yi was merely used to describe foreigners, a              
journey in 1832 made the character out to refer to foreigners as barbarians. The issue further                
came to prominence in 1834, when the charter of the BEIC expired and the British crown                
tried to take over trading with the Chinese. Lord Napier, the first official representative of the                
British government to deal with the Qing empire, sailed into Guangzhou without the proper              
credentials and identifiers, and was subsequently turned away and told to send messages to              
the governor-general of Guangzhou via intermediaries. When he discovered that he had been             
referred to as yimu, which his interpreter had translated as “the barbarian eye”, his irritation               
turned to indignation, and vowed to punish the governor-general in the name of the British               
Crown. The subsequent military action taken was the first taken by the British government on               
Chinese soil, and it did not even start due to opium or trade but a curious (mis-) translation                  
77 Lydia Liu, ​The Clash of Empires​: 13 
78 Lydia Liu, ​The Clash of Empires​: 41. 
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insulting the honour of the British government. When the first Opium War broke out, the               79
super-sign yi/barbarian was written into the Treaty of Nanking, forbidding the use of ​yi ​to               
refer to any delegates of the British government. 
While it was originally a catachrestic translation (whether intentional or no), the            
yi/barbarian translation paved the way for the colonial civilised vs. uncivilised dichotomy for             
the ‘scramble’ for China. Political wills and imperial pride, prominent in both the UK and in                
Qing China, meant that Chinese expectations, such as koutou (kowtow) and other forms of              
prostration before the Emperor, collided with an indoctrinated sense of British pride,            
privilege, and faith in British superiority. This clash of identity had certainly not been              
unprecedented - the BEIC had been referring to the Chinese as “barbarians” as early as 1721,                
and according to British decision makers, the fact that they themselves were being referred to               
as barbarians (again, whether it was intentional or not is not clear) was nothing but absurd.                80
Despite the fact that the Qing dynasty held an incredible position of strength in the world of                 
the time, the perception of it as a barbarian and it’s supposed ‘fall’ into barbarism defined                
China over it’s past century and it’s re-entering into the fold of ‘civilised’ states.  81
The importance of language translation continues to persist to this day, especially in             
China-‘West’ relations. One of the main criticisms that are levied against the hegemony of              
the English language, and it’s cultural undertones, is that it “fail[s] to respect the difference of                
others, and expects others [...] to simply become like the imagined American/Western self.”             82
This almost unconscious insistence that the Western models and approaches to how the world              
is shaped has resulted in a rather crucial misunderstanding of modern Chinese stances on              
79 Lydia Liu, ​Clash of Empires​: 46 - 47 
80 Lydia Liu, ​Clash of Empires​: 61 
81 Lydia Liu, ​Clash of Empires​. 
82 Astrid Nordin, “Hegemony in Chinese? ​Ba in Chinese international relations,” in ​Politics of the ‘other’ in                 
India and China: western concepts in non-western contexts​, eds. Konig and Chaudhuri (London: Routledge,              
2016): 9. 
25 
T​HOMAS VAN ​E​LS 
L​ANGUAGE, ​P​OLITICAL ​E ​CONOMY, AND ​G ​LOBAL ​IR​(EVOLUTION) 
 
their international relations and their relationship vis-a-vis the USA. The primary character            
that is used in Chinese literature to talk about hegemony in this sense is the character ​ba ​(霸).                  
While it is most commonly translated or used to refer to “the leadership of one state [...] over                  
other states in the system”, it maintains a strong moral undertone due to it’s combination with                
other characters into words such as ​baju​, ​baqi​, or ​bashu​; to take over by force,               
aggressiveness, and despotic conduct, respectively. The Chinese understanding of ​ba​, rather           
than just referring to leadership as a whole, refers to a “despotic and aggressive leadership               
that operates through force and coercion.”  83
Due to the erroneous (or literal) translation of the term, when the Chinese government              
claims it will not become a ​ba ​power, they mean that they will not become an immoral or                  
despotic power, and not that they don’t aim to become a hegemon in the English sense of the                  
word. When the Chinese government refers to the United States as a hegemon, as              
Cunningham-Cross and Callahan point out, English speakers “probably think that it is big and              
powerful, while Chinese speakers definitely think that it is immoral and evil.” This loss of               84
meaning due to translation leads to a lot of unnecessary tension in international affairs and               
many missed scholarly opportunities, as observers, pundits, and scholars divide themselves           
into the (acknowledged as) Orientalist “China as a threat” vs “China as an opportunity”              
camps.  85
The interactions between China and the English language, particularly when placed in            
a Global IR context, not only show how language is used as a tool of empire , but also how it                    86
continues to shape and misinterpret the actions of other actors in the global stage. Where               
83 Nordin, “Hegemony in Chinese?”: 8-9 
84 Linsay Cunningham-Cross and William A. Callahan, “Ancient Chinese Power, Modern Chinese Thought,”             
Chinese Journal of International Politics​ 4, no. 4 (2011): 367. Cited in Nordin, “Hegemony in Chinese?”: 12. 
85 Nordin, “Hegemony in Chinese?” 3. 
86 Lydia H. Liu, “The Thug, the Barbarian, and the Work of Injury in Imperial Warfare,” ​PMLA​, Vol. 124, no. 5,                     
Special Topic: War (Oct., 2009): 1860. 
26 
T​HOMAS VAN ​E​LS 
L​ANGUAGE, ​P​OLITICAL ​E ​CONOMY, AND ​G ​LOBAL ​IR​(EVOLUTION) 
 
China is trying to challenge the position of the West, it’s actions are translated into English in                 
a way that conveniently implies that it does not. While this thesis will not tackle the impacts                 
of these framing methods, they do expose an issue that Global IR has to be conscious of when                  
referring to language - translation simultaneously reflects the interests of the translator as it              
does the words of the translated. As Acharya strongly advocates that Global IR incorporates              
translation and translation services into its proposed methodology to achieve it’s agenda , it             87
needs to be aware of how merely ‘translating’ into English may result in the original meaning                
of the text being lost in translation. To rely on the Wattsian myth of English being the                 
academic language risks continued alienation of the non-Western contribution - D’aoust’s           
quote of problematizing ‘just publish in English’ comes to mind here. 
Another problematization that the linguistic turn has helped show is the term            
Globalisation - and more specifically, howabouts it is produced. Globalisation is a difficult             
term to define. As Kamola argues, the confusion surrounding the term of globalisation does              
not come from it’s inherent conflicting ideological and discursive practices, but instead from             
the fact that the “prevailing academic concept of globalisation depends upon a particular             
global imaginary produced within contemporary institutions of higher education.”         88
Kamola’s argument takes two central approaches - the conceptualisation of a ​global            
imaginary ​, and the role of Western academic institutions and their political economies in the              
creation of this imaginary. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter. 
While Kamola draws on the works of Charles Taylor, Manfred Steger, and Louis             
Althusser, he predominantly focuses on grounding the concept of a ​global imaginary by             
87 Acharya, “Advancing Global IR,” ​International Studies Review (2016): 13; as Acharya points out, the               
International Studies Perspectives journal already accepts non-English submissions, but then translates them into             
English. D’aoust’s point of needing to be writing in English to be seen as ‘doing IR’ seemingly rings true here. 
88 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary,” ​BJPIR​, (2014): 515. 
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rigorously theorising about the concept. By defining how it is produced, rather than merely              
acknowledging that it exists, Kamola defines the ​global imaginary as “a set of commonly              
shared understandings and practices that render the great diversity of social life as already              
constituting a single, coherent ‘global’ whole.” By presenting globalisation as an empirical            89
reality, other potential theorisations or approaches to the concept are disabled - the Western              
metaphysics of presence, mentioned before, manifests itself in this regard as well. Kamola             
breaks down the recurring metaphor of globalisation as a “proverbial elephant, described by             
its blind observers in so many ways.” The core assumptions of the metaphor are that the                90
studying of globalisation depends on the assumption that globalisation is a present and active              
metaphysical force, even with it’s many odd and confusing components, and it merely needs              
a fully trained, interdisciplinary social scientist to be able to see this ‘elephant’ for what it                
truly is.  
These sentiments echo what can be perceived as an assumption within the            
philosophical core of Global IR; that there exists an indisputably present body of knowledge              
on, and approaches to, international relations that do not originate from the Western traditions              
of IR, and that an increased degree of awareness and training on the matter will help                
incorporate them into IR. In this notion, it can be argued that Acharya’s “Global IR” project                
is built around the existence of a proverbial elephant that has been ignored by traditional IR                
scholarship, which brings with it it’s own problems. Drawing from Kamola’s argument in             
this vein, Global IR may not actually contain any meaning other than “serving as a useful and                 
timely hook around which to amass different, incoherent phenomena that nonetheless become            
89 Ibid. 
90 Jameson (1998): xi, and Steger (2003): 14, cited in Kamola, (2014): 517. 
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imagined as all parts of the same phenomenon” of a single, global academic whole.              91
Kamola’s own metaphor on the matter may help demonstrate this point further: 
“...a handful of social scientists share a typical academic office through which steady streams of               
students, colleagues, books, office furniture, and administrative memos constantly circulate. One           
scholar declares: ‘I’m checking my email. This is globalisation!’ Another says, ‘I’m going to Hong               
Kong for field research. This is globalisation!’ Another, refilling the coffee pot, says ‘This coffee is                
from Kenya. This is globalisation!’ Another chimes in: ‘I’m currently reading about water             
conservation in Liberia. This is globalisation!’ One impudent graduate student asks, ‘If all this is               
globalisation, then what is it?’ After deliberation they conclude that the Internet, foreign travel,              
Kenyan coffee and Liberian water conservation are all essentially parts of the same creature. While               
no elephant exists, this does not prevent every aspect of the room from becoming understood as an                 
ear, leg or tail that together constitute a whole. These scholars give meaning to their shared world                 
as if an elephant stood at its center - they are, in other words, ​producing an elephant at the level of                     
the imaginary.”  92
Kamola’s point on how the concept of Globalisation is an imaginary echoes the main              
argument that Liu made about the construction of the ​yi/barbarian supersign - that the origin               
of both lies in a ‘Western’ conceptualisation. Both are imagined concepts that nonetheless             
have (had) a profound impact on the way that the world order is perceived by others. The                 
yi/barbarian supersign provided the British Empire with a reason to interfere in Chinese state              
affairs, as well as (formally) creating the familiar us/them dynamic of the colonial times.              
Similarly, the lack of context in the case of ​ba only confuses the intentions of the Chinese                 
government, whose assertions of wanting to become a different type of hegemon falls on deaf               
ears due to the absence of context in the translations. 
While this part of Kamola’s argument does paint a pessimistic picture of Global IR’s              
nature (if the notion of non-Western IR is but the product of an imagined ​presence of                
potential non-Western IR theories, are they worth studying?), it is important to not mistake              
this as an invitation to ignore major, genuinely global problems. However, it does raise some               
considerations that Global IR will have to keep in mind as it continues to develop. If the idea                  
91 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 518. 
92 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 519. 
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of globalisation (and, to a degree, Global IR) is about how the idea of a globalised world is                  
imagined, the question becomes about who is the one that is doing the imagining about the                
topic, and how does this impact the development of Global IR? This thesis now turns IR’s                
political economy, and the risks that it may have on the development of Global IR.  
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Ch. 3 - Counter-(I)Revolutionary 
The Political Economy of IR, its Relationship with Language, and the           
IRevolution 
As has been established in the previous chapter, language does not exist separately             
from various power dynamics that have existed throughout history. The homogenous nature            
of English and, as can be conferred from the second half of Kamola’s argument, the               
increasing homogeneity of the university as a institution of research rather than an institution              
of education highly impacts the production of knowledge throughout IR academia. Both            
within the ‘West’ as within the ‘Rest’, the role of the university in producing the global                
imaginary and in producing ideas about the global imaginary will be tackled in this chapter.               
By combining the remainder of Kamola’s argument - the role of the university in producing               
the global imaginary - with wider observations about the role of language in IR and IR’s                
political economy that can be made from the previous chapters, this chapter will demonstrate              
some of the issues that Global IR has to take into account going forward. 
Kamola initially argues that globalisation, as we know it, is imaginary in nature;             
rather than there being an objectively present ‘elephant’ of a concept of globalisation, the              
term is imagined by the combining of various different observations that, despite being             
almost completely unrelated and at times contradictory to one another, are still perceived to              
be a part of a single whole. If globalisation is supposed to be an imagined product of the                  
modern day and age, why is it then that it has reached such a position of prominence in the                   
collective thoughts of many in this day and age? As Kamola argues, the fact that the origins                 
of this global imaginary are produced in fundamentally different ways doesn’t matter -             
drawing from Althusserian arguments, Kamola argues that “one’s imaginary relation to the            
world is not single or static but constantly changing as contradictory material apparatuses             
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create the conditions for competing, and often fragmented, imaginar​ies ​.” Rather than there            93
being a collective global imaginary, every individual has their own imaginary, produced            
when “different subjects immersed within various apparatuses [...] engage in particular yet            
structured material practices through which they come to imagine their particular relation to             
the world.” According to Kamola, if we apply this conceptualisation to the field of IR, we                94
can conceptualise “how the knowledge we produce is already shaped by material changes,             
including struggles and resistances, taking place within the university [​sic​].” According to            95
Althusser, the school had become “the ‘dominant’ ideological apparatus through which           
people come to imagine their relation to the world” by the ‘70s, and with the high numbers                 96
of people in the ‘West’ with university degrees , the turn to look at these institutions makes                97
sense for his argument. Kamola argues that, “in recent decades, a series of structural              
transformations in higher education have remade American universities from apparatuses for           
producing national imaginaries into ones highly productive of global imaginaries.”  98
The orientation around American universities makes sense, as all major institutions           
and courses of IR comes from the West, as do all of the big journals in IR. Even a cursory                    
glance at Top 10 ranking lists, such as that found on topuniversities.com, displays this trend -                
the top ten consists of five schools located in the United States (Harvard, Yale, Princeton,               
Berkeley, Columbia), three are found in the United Kingdom (Oxford, LSE, and Cambridge),             
one in France, and one in Australia. The first listing not within the Anglophone world is the                 
93 Louis Althusser, ​For Marx (New York: Vintage Books, 1970): 233-4, cited in Kamola, “US Universities and                 
Global Imaginaries”: 523. 
94 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 523. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and ideological state apparatus (notes towards an investigation),” in his ​Lenin and                
Philosophy and Other Essays​, trans. B. Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001): 106. Cited in                
Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary,” ​BJPIR​, Vol. 16 (2014): 523. 
97 “Percentage of adults who have earned a university degree, by country 2007,” ​Statista.com​. Accessed online 1                 
January, 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/232951/university-degree-attainment-by-country/ 
98 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 524. 
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National University of Singapore on position 15, and the first university from a country that               
does not align with the ‘West’ is Peking University on position 28. Furthermore, as Kamola               99
points out, “the American-style research university ‘is being replicated around the world’ as             
various countries come to realise ‘that the road to economic success runs through college              
campuses’.”  100
How is it, then, that the academy helps produce the global imaginary? As Kamola              
argues, up until “a few decades ago, the US university primarily produced a national              
imaginary.” With the perception of the world revolving around nation-states in conflict,            101
American universities found “a growing sense of national obligation - combined with            
lucrative funding opportunities - encouraging many universities to cultivate closer          
relationships with the federal government.” With the growing need for useful information            102
about colonial and post-colonial states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (that didn’t reduce              
these states to ‘tribal’ or ‘primitive’ peoples and societies), a heavy amount of funding went               
into the social sciences, which adapted itself to developing regional specialisations to meet             
these demands. Similarly, this period helped in the development of the imaginary of the              103
world as “composed of a series of nation-states” , producing the prominence of realism in              104
the field. 
However, as Reaganism and Thatcherism “gave primary importance to capitalist          
markets as the provider of all social wealth,” universities found themselves receiving            105
99 “Politics & International Studies”. 2018. ​Top Universities​. 
100 Ben Wildavsky, ​The Great Brain Race: How Global Universities Are Reshaping the World ​(Princeton, NJ:                
Princeton University Press, 2010): 41. Cited in Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 525. 
101 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 524. 
102 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 525. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Kamola, “US Universitites and Global Imaginary”: 526. 
105 David Harvey, ​A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), cited in Kamola,                
“US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 527. 
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funding from “private and corporate philanthropy, the marketisation of research, the           
privatisation of student services, and higher tuition” as funding from federal and state             
governments was withdrawn. These funders were “generally uninterested in developing a           
body of seemingly esoteric area studies knowledge, and instead preferred research relevant to             
the new economic trends.” With the ongoing growth of the global international market, this              106
meant that universities focused more on putting the focus on ‘global’ issues to remain an               
attractive option for funding, and for students to go to receive their ‘global’ education. Those               
academics who had been trained in area studies before these structural shifts began reframing              
their work in terms of globalisation. In sum, Kamola argues that the tendency to see the                107
current world as various facets of a single phenomenon known as globalisation has only              
really come about because of an imaginary that has been produced by institutions adapting to               
changing social relations within which academic knowledge was created. 
If the turn to globalisation is a part of a global imaginary, is Global IR a response to                  
this? If there is an increasing amount of funding for universities coming from outside of the                
native community, could the concept of Global IR not simply be a academic attempt to attract                
more funding from these sources; a response to the desires of donors, sponsors, financers and               
funds to create an IR that is more inclusive in it’s understanding of the acts of other states due                   
to the failing dominance and diminishing significance of the ‘West’? Or is it an attempt to                
make IR academia a more attractive option for funding from an increasingly economically             
powerful ‘non-West’? If Global IR aims to be a more inclusive approach to IR, it will have to                  
think about how it was shaped by the political economy it started out in, and how political                 
economy will continue to impact it as it aims to grow. 
106 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 527. 
107 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 528. 
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If Global IR aims to become a more valuable undertaking within IR as an academic field -                 
one that challenges the core approaches and assumptions that IR has been working with for               
the past decades - it will have to pay closer attention to how it’s political economy has shaped                  
and continues to shape how Global IR scholarship is produced - both in how the underlying                
thought has come about, as well as how this underlying thought is constructed. 
As mentioned before, this thesis is a problematization of the goals of Global IR -               
particularly it’s subsuming, rather than supplanting of existing IR knowledge and theories,            
and it’s eschewing of the exceptionalism that has existed up until this point in IR. If Global                 
IR subsumes the existing methodologies of IR, how will non-Western understandings,           
particularly those that come about in other languages, be able to make their points clearly?               
The insistence of writing IR in English, while a useful tool to cross certain linguistic               
boundaries, risks jeopardising the integrity of certain terms because their translations in            
English do not do the full interests of the term justice. If Global IR aims to eschew the                  
exceptionalism that has existed in IR scholarship to this point, will the predominant locations              
and institutions of knowledge production be willing to give up their position of             
exceptionalism and allow for the development of alternative methods of knowledge           
production? With the predominant locations of knowledge production within IR being in the             
‘West’ and benefiting the ‘West’, Global IR will need to have a good look at how it can                  
encourage the development of non-Western ideas in IR and the nurturing of non-Western             
talents beyond the confines of the Western academy. 
The second half of Kamola’s argument poses a series of questions that will require a               
long and hard look from within Global IR. Firstly, is Global IR a serious academic pushback                
against the dominance of the West, or a response to the desires of donors, sponsors, and                
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university administrators to adapt to an era where these individuals are no longer able to rely                
on the supremacy of the United States to justify the expenses? To what extent is it the one or                   
the other? Is Global IR a genuine attempt to incorporate and enable non-Western scholars and               
(pre-)theories into the fold of IR, or is it a project of tenured professors and established names                 
in IR academia who are looking for a chance to continue securing their jobs and funding? 
IR is a field in crisis, which is why it remains important to ask these questions about                 
the ​availability to engage with Global IR if it is to be seen as a way forward in the academic                    
field. The world that IR is meant to be studying is continuing to adapt at a fast pace, and if (in                     
vein with Kamola’s argument) it is being looked into by financiers to develop relevant              
-knowledge for a ‘global’ future, preparing scholars to pick up the mantle when the current               
generation of scholars working on Global IR either retire or leave the concept behind. It is out                 
of a heartfelt belief that Global IR has the potential to prepare future generations of scholars                
that this thesis asks Global IR to take its own political economy and the role that language                 
may play therein seriously. 
As has been pointed out before, Global IR is seeking ways to distance itself from its                
Western dominance, as well as move away from its reliance on the intellectual authority and               
agency claims of the West. The institutions through which it publishes IR are in the West ,                108
and the language in which IR is done is English . In this vein, it is impossible to avoid the                   109
shadow of the West in IR. ‘Proper’ IR academia will always involve the West, be it through                 
it’s publishing institutions, or through the language in which IR is performed. 
As was elaborated on earlier in this thesis, language plays a sizeable role in how ideas                
in IR are formed - but it also plays a role in how academia in IR is published. As English is                     
108 Acharya, “Global IR and Regional Worlds”: 649. 
109 D’aoust, “Language in the Sociology of IR”: 121. 
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the language in which IR is done, it is strongly expected of those who submit articles for                 
publishing to have a native-level proficiency in English. This overemphasis on English as ​the              
language of IR ignores the complexities that exist between language and knowledge creation.             
With English as closely connected to the West as it is, it seals off and prevents other                 
languages from developing into a language of science by structurally favouring English, and             
believing that this favouring is justified and necessary, as Bunce et al. have argued. This               
combines with Watts’ concept of myths about English, presenting a risk that the idea that               
‘English is the language of academic knowledge production’ is not only enforced from the              
top down, by the demanding of a high degree of proficiency in English by the gatekeepers of                 
IR, but also from the bottom up, reinforced by these myths and creating expectations that IR                
has to be done in English to be seen as valid. 
Furthermore, the solution of the ISA that is posited by Acharya - accepting             
submissions in non-English languages and then translating them into English before           
publishing - does not provide a solution to the problem in the first place. By translating and                 
structuring the writing of a non-English language into English, the Western ideas and             
methods are again superimposed onto non-Western methods, structures, or approaches to           
thought; without the original author to correct on mistranslations it risks misrepresenting the             
argument entirely. Translation reflects the interests of the translator as well as the words of               
the translated. Western notions risk being imposed on top of non-Western terms, theories, and              
approaches (as is the case with the Chinese sign ​ba ​), or they are mistranslated entirely (such                
as the case of the ​yi/barbarian supersign). English, being as closely associated to the              
logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence inherent in Western philosophical thought as it             
is, risks warping the intended meaning by assuming a presence. The contextual meaning that              
can be attached to certain characters, as ​ba​ demonstrates, can similarly be lost in translation. 
37 
T​HOMAS VAN ​E​LS 
L​ANGUAGE, ​P ​OLITICAL ​E​CONOMY, AND ​G ​LOBAL ​IR ​(EVOLUTION) 
 
This leads us into the the first aspect that this thesis will suggest that Global IR                
considers doing differently: moving away from entirely ‘doing IR’ in English - whether this              
is through domestic, non-English journals, as Tang suggests, or a restructuring of how             
existing journals interact with non-English submissions would be a step that could produce a              
more generally applicable IR that is not as beholden to the West. It is important to be careful                  
that we do not encourage the world to focus more on regionalism and regions while doing                
this. 
While language is an aspect of the global economy of IR, it is only one part of the                  
process that Global IR will need to address going forward. IR’s political economy,             
particularly the role that American institutions have played in the forming of IR as a               
discipline, also warrants an investigation. While calling for the incorporation of non-Western            
ideas and theories, Global IR needs to watch out that it genuinely does incorporate and create                
an atmosphere in which non-Western IR can grow and blossom. For, as Eun points out,               
merely calling for a ‘greater diversity’ of scholars working in IR does not necessarily mean               
that this will lead to a greater diversity of ideas that circulate within IR.  110
Eun, in his response to David Lake’s “White Man’s IR: An Intellectual Confession”             111
argues that, while it is an important step to developing a greater diversity of conduct in IR,                 
merely calling for a greater diversity in terms of race/culture and gender in academia is a                
flawed endeavour, for those scholars of various other races, cultures, and genders than the              
‘white males’ that David Lake works with are socialised into thinking in the ways that IR is                 
established, and this socialisation into the way that IR has been performed is severely              112
110 Yong-Soo Eun, “An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the “Non-White” IR Community: A Friendly                
Reply to David Lake’s “White Man’s IR”,” ​PS: Political Science & Politics​, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2019). 
111 See David Lake, “White Man’s IR: An Intellectual Confession,” Perspectives on Politics​, Vol. 14, no. 4                  
(2016) 
112 Eun, “An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the “Non-White” IR Community”: 79. 
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limiting the development of “non-Western” IR. IR is done within the purview of three              
theoretical frameworks: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The goal of IR work is to             
produce work that fits into the positivist discipline, and as we have established earlier in               113
this paper, it has to be done in English to even be genuinely acknowledged as doing IR, with                  
all the detriments of this. As Eun argues, 
“Lake confesses as follow: attempts to enhance diversity are “often resented by currently privileged 
groups … as a ‘watering down’ of standards in the discipline” (Lake 2016, 1117). The 
“mainstream” of the profession creates “a self-reinforcing community standard” by acting as 
“gatekeepers” regarding what is studied and how - although these gatekeepers are “rarely 
self-conscious in their biases and even less … intentional in their exclusionary practices” (Lake 
2016, 1116) [​sic.​]  114
A mere “greater diversity of scholars”, as a result, does not result in a “greater               
theoretical diversity”, a “greater understanding of world politics”, or a “greater diversity of             
conduct” in IR, as this greater Because of the way that IR is practiced, IR scholars from all                  115
over the world “follow the research standard set by the mainstream rather than redefining              
how we theorise about world politics, what counts as a valid question, and what can count as                 
valid forms of evidence and knowledge.” Eun concludes that the key to incorporating             116
“marginalised” non- Western scholars, with their “different life experiences and intuitions”,           
is a critical self-reflection, both by the scholars in the West, and (particularly) by these               
marginalised scholars, around who the Global IR project circulates. 
Global IR does need to watch out that it does not fall into the same pitfalls as those                  
that Lake and Eun detailed above. Many of the contributors to the project - names like                
Acharya, Bilgin, Buzan, Qin, Tang, Vale - are in the very position that Lake states are the                 
very people who may end up unintentionally gatekeeping the contributions that other scholars             
113 Eun, “An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the “Non-White” IR Community”: 78 - 80. 
114 Eun, “An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the “Non-White” IR Community”: 81. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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try to make to the Global IR project - and it is only the more established names in their                   
respective fields that have enough stability in their careers to be able to turn to non-Western                
‘pre-theories’. 
Younger scholars, due to the political economy in IR, would be taking a risk in trying                
to further the agenda of Global IR - not merely because of the risk that it is gate-kept, but also                    
because of the reality of IR’s political economy. The prevalent publish or perish culture              
throughout academia can be considered a major cause for the homogeneity of IR thought              
throughout the various IR communities throughout the world, especially if one considers the             
fact that so many of IR’s current major publications can find their origins in the West. 
Considering the shift from the state-led production of the national imaginary to the             
market-led production of the global imaginary as was detailed by Kamola, the focus on              
publishing as a form of career building in IR comes with a number of observations. 
Firstly, the fact that so many of the prominent institutions in IR are in the West, and                 
so many of the major journals in IR are written in English, means that writing in IR, if not                   
about the ‘West’, is at all times still beholden to the West to be taken seriously . As one has                   117
to publish often to be able to build a career for themselves, the best bets that many beginning                  
scholars have to build themselves a career is to submit to these numerous Western journals.               
Due to the bulk of writing that they have to do to be able to create a career, the simplest thing                     
that young scholars can do to build a career is to write within the confines of the gatekeeping                  
practices of IR - which means, the frameworks of realism, liberalism, and constructivism are              
adhered to, and the statements are positivist in nature. As translation into English to be able to                 
117 Eun also points out that many of the IR schools and journals that exist in East Asia remain set in the                      
methodology of the West, remaining ascribed to the three main methods of IR thought production (realism,                
liberalism, constructivism), and are almost all predominantly positivists in nature. See: Eun, “An Intellectual              
Confession from a member of the “Non-White” IR Community”: 79 - 80. 
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submit to these journals costs money, which younger scholars do not all have, it is easier to                 
simply write in English; after all, it is the “global language”, and you keep agency over what                 
you write. Before young scholars can spend time thinking and developing contributions to             
notions like Global IR, they need to build a career for themselves; and, perhaps more               
importantly, survive. Up until this point, non-Western scholars and non-Western ideas do not             
have the time, nor the place, to develop contributions to Global IR. 
Secondly, due to the emphasis on writing and publishing, these young scholars do not              
have the time to perform the critical self-reflection that Eun suggests is necessary, nor do they                
have the time to develop a critical thought or observations that could contribute to Global IR.                
If Global IR aims to provide an avenue for serious contributions from and about non-Western               
approaches to IR, it needs to take a good look at how it can take a step beyond the                   
contradictions that have existed throughout IR up until this point. If IR’s political economy              
and the importance of English is what is holding back this desired diversification of IR, then                
Global IR should dedicate serious effort into looking at how this diversification, considering             
the arguments made throughout this paper, can be worked into practice by tweaking IR’s              
practice. 
While many suggestions for a new focus in what is studied in IR have been provided               
, this thesis would like to offer another suggestion that tackles the problems that have been                118
brought to the fore in the thesis. An interesting possible solution would be to collaborate with                
domestic, non-English journals and publish the same articles in multiple languages           
simultaneously. While dismissed earlier in the thesis as “unlikely to happen” , this process             119
118 See Einar Wigen, “Two level language games: International relations as inter-lingual relations,” ​European              
Journal of International Relations Vol. 21, no. 2 (2015), or Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the                 
Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” ​Millenium: Journal of International Studies​, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2002)                
for two examples of how an orientation around language might provide alternative methods of studying IR. 
119 See: pg. 9 
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should not be a one-way street, to avoid the centralising of all knowledge production around a                
single region as it is being done right now. This way, the stigma around having to be writing                  
in English to be seen as “doing IR” would be problematised, it would open the avenues for                 
additional dialogue about the roles and interplays that language brings with it within the              
academic discipline, and we would be focusing on the interplay between regions and the              120
more global aspects of IR - the incorporation of regions and regionalisms, while eschewing              
the exceptionalism of the English language by elevating other languages to a similar status.  
120 Again, an interesting topic for another research paper. 
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Conclusion 
Fighting for the IRevolution’s future 
This thesis focused on two of the six points that Global IR espouses - the subsuming,                
rather than supplanting, existing IR theories and methods, and the eschewing of            
exceptionalism - and while it didn’t set out to initially, many of the points that are made                 
throughout the thesis can be applied to another point; the integration of the study of regions,                
regionalisms, and area studies. However, Global IR as it initially was posited overlooked the              
importance of language , and only made a brief mention of it after incorporating feedback             121 122
. Language, however, should not be left to the wayside in Global IR’s agenda, as language                
has shaped, and continues to shape and confuse the interactions of states in the current global                
world. What is more, the use of English in particular presents a problem to the development                
of Global IR, as it stifles the development of other schools of thought and only reinforces the                 
position of strength that the ‘West’ has, as core concepts that are embedded within the use of                 
English distort and warp the meaning of particular interactions on the global stage, as              
translation simultaneously reflects the interests of the translator as well as the words of the               
translated. Furthermore, due to the logocentrism that is so deeply entrenched in the English              
language, we have ​constructed the modern world of globalisation, by imagining many            
“different, incoherent phenomena”  as part of a single elephant called globalisation. 123
The question that this raised is, “who is it that does this imagining?” Particularly              
within the realm of IR the answer has already been established as the ‘West’. The notion of                 
globalisation, and the impact that the scholarly world had on the bringing of the term into                
mainstream thought, furthermore, appears to be a response to a shift within the political              
121 Acharya, “Global IR and Regional Worlds.” 
122 Acharya, “Advancing Global IR”: 12 - 13. 
123 Kamola, “US Universities and Global Imaginary”: 518. 
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economies of universities. With the emphasis shifted to publishing articles and attracting            
financers through this, the academic culture of today means that the developing of rigorously              
thought through and critical research that would be able to contribute to the Global IR agenda                
takes a back seat in terms of the developing of a career within IR - within which, young                  
scholars will have to ascribe to the pre-existing methodologies and worldviews before they             
can contribute to the development of Global IR. This, in turn, has the potential to severely                
limit the possibilities of growth that Global IR has, remaining a project of those whose               
careers have already been established. 
It is both fitting and ironic, perhaps, that this thesis is titled Global IR(evolution).              
Much of the criticism that has been levied at Global IR in this thesis finds its roots in French                   
philosophical thought, through the contributions that have been brought to the scholarly field             
via the linguistic turn and the influences of constructivism. The orientation around political             
economy as an influencing factor - while coincidental in origin - found its general origins in                
the works of French Marxist philosophers. Furthermore, as IR’s history has long been a              
one-way observing of the ‘Rest’ by scholars of both the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’, the changes                
that Global IR is calling for can be sufficiently cast as a revolution in how IR is practiced.                  
However, while revolutions might not necessarily be a violent affair, Global IR does need to               
remain focused on seeing that it’s revolution comes to fruition. 
Global IR is a step in the direction of a more egalitarian IR that matches more with                 
how the modern world works - especially with the increasing strength of more nationalist and               
regional organisations and powers. Merely continuing the way that IR has done until this              
point will mean that IR risks remaining flat-footed in a time where changes come hard and                
fast. However, this does not mean that it is without it’s problems. If Global IR genuinely                
desires to show a way forward for IR, it needs to be more inclusive to the younger                 
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generations - the future torchbearers for the field - and provide them the room to genuinely                
tackle world problems, as well as a place and the ability to develop approaches to IR that are                  
not predicated on the American method. The process will be hard, but by remaining open to                
approaches from African IR, by giving Chinese IR the room to think and develop, or by                
engaging in serious dialogue with Latin American IR, Global IR will help the field find itself                
it’s sense of policy purpose once more.  
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